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B R I E F I N G

to the

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

on Some 10/5 Problems

by the

CHAIRMAN OF THE 10/5 PANEL

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**BRIEFING TO PSB ON SOME 10/5 PROBLEMS  
BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE 10/5 PANEL.**

- A. Purpose of Briefing.
- B. Summary of Steps Leading Up to Briefing.
- C. Approval of "Packet".
- D. Certain Unresolved Issues.
- E. Responsibilities of the 10/5 Panel?

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A. THE PURPOSE OF THE BRIEFING.

The word "briefing" on the agenda is somewhat misleading. I should be extremely reluctant to "brief" the Board on 10/5, as each of you already has considerable familiarity with the subject, quite aside from the fact that General Smith is the undisputed expert. What I am really doing is asking for a "briefing in reverse"; or, in other words, seeking the Board's help and guidance on behalf of the 10/5 Panel so that it can function as the Board's screening agent, as completely and intelligently as possible. Study of the famous "Packet" has shown us as members of the Panel that there are some issues which should be submitted for Board consideration.

B. SUMMARY OF THE STEPS LEADING UP TO THE BRIEFING.

To provide the proper framework for the issues which we wish to raise, I believe it will be of advantage to review briefly the background of NSC 10/5.

✓ NSC 10/2, approved by the President in June 1946, directed the undertaking of covert operations by OPC (then called the Office of Special Projects) on behalf of the U.S. Government. The DCI was given the ultimate responsibility and was instructed to ensure,

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through representatives of State and Defense, that such covert operations were consistent with U.S. policy. The 10/2 Representatives, consisting of General Magruder, General Balmer, and Mr. Joyce, have been meeting with the Chief of OPC each week to give such policy guidance. In addition, there is day-to-day liaison by CIA, not only with State and Defense, but also with other appropriate departments and agencies.

The normal growth of CIA operations under 10/2, the approval and implementation of the NSC 68 Series, and additional requirements placed on CIA by State, Defense, and the JCS (such as support for programs in Korea and China; the retardation program; resistance programs; stockpiling; and oil-denial programs), indicated to DCI that the covert program was fast expanding beyond the horizons seen at the time of its creation. Accordingly, CIA sought additional guidance from NSC in the "Scope and Pace" or "Magnitude" Paper of May 6, 1951, in which were set forth two fundamental issues, clarification of which was considered essential to orderly growth.

These were --

1. High policy approval of increases in personnel and expenditures required by requested programs, but going beyond limits thought to have been intended by NSC in June 1948, plus approval of substantial additional increases, if all the programs being thrust upon OPC were even to be attempted;
2. High policy decisions as to the direction and nature of covert operations.

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With respect to the direction and nature of the covert program OPC was faced with major decisions. CIA interpreted the NSC 68 Series as establishing the desirability of large scale covert operations but felt that these policies had not been translated into a directive sufficiently specific for the operational guidance of OPC.

Here is a sampling of the kind of decisions then troubling CIA:

1. Should OPC emphasize covert activities in support of cold war or in support of preparation for hot war? For example, should OPC properly give top priority to a European retardation plan as requested by the JCS?

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2. How should OPC resolve the differing military and political concepts relating to the build-up, maintenance and use of resistance groups?
3. Should activities, such as paramilitary, be changed from covert to overt? If so, when and how?

These basic problems prompted CIA to ask for guidance in four areas: (1) the scope and pace of covert operations for cold war and preparation for hot war; (2) redetermination of responsibilities for covert operations; (3) assurance of logistical support; and (4) coordinated guidance from PSB.

The NSC responded to the "Magnitude" Paper in NSC 10/5, approved by the President on October 23, 1951. This stated that the NSC "approves in principle as a national responsibility the immediate expansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2", thereby answering at least in part the primary CIA worry as to OPC's increase in size. This answer, however, merely emphasizes the rest of 10/5, which is devoted to the question of objectives and how to develop a covert program.

Obviously, the best size for OPC can never be determined with engineering accuracy. But equally obviously, the size of OPC should be responsive, in a general way, to various considerations, among which, in our opinion, are three important ones that will be discussed in greater detail in a moment. These considerations are:

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1. What are the correct interpretations of national objectives?
2. What is the national program for achieving them?
3. How large can the OPC program become without disclosing the hand of the U.S.?

As to objectives the NSC called for an intensification of covert operations designed to: (1) place maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power; (2) contribute towards retraction of Soviet power and influence; (3) orient the free world towards the U.S., and (4) develop resistance and guerilla operations.

With regard to program, 10/5 in effect says to CIA, "We recognize your need for guidance; we will not spell it out for you ourselves; we will, however, provide you with a mechanism which should resolve your dilemmas."

The mechanism was PSB, then a young and only just flattering fledgeling. PSB was directed to include in its strategic concept provision for covert operations to achieve the objectives just mentioned. Moreover, PSB was given the responsibility for: (1) determining desirability and feasibility of covert programs and major projects, and (2) establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations.

In furtherance of these responsibilities, the Board on February 27, 1952 approved the creation of a panel that includes

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25X1A the 10/2 Representatives already described, plus two PSB members,

[redacted] At the same time, an administrative procedure was adopted for reviewing programs and projects.

25X1A On March 20, 1952, CIA submitted to PSB the "Packet", which consists of the CIA/OPC Strategic Plan, a Budget Analysis for FY 1953, Programs and Major Projects [redacted], and their Support Requirements -- a total documentation of about 300 pages, including descriptions of some 100-odd projects.

The 10/5 Panel has now studied the "Packet", in the light of 10/2, the "Magnitude" Paper, 10/5 and other NSC papers. This study has convinced us that many of the "Magnitude"-type issues still demand clarification and that serious Board consideration is essential. ✓ Whatever time may be required for this consideration, however, the Board, in our opinion, need not delay its approval of such, perhaps all, of the "Packet".

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C. APPROVAL OF THE "PACKET"

Without prejudice to any strategy which PSB may later evolve, via the Stevens Group or by other means; without prejudice to further analysis of the "Packet" (such as the information which has been requested by the JCS representative in order to provide more readily comparable figures on supporting personnel and materiel being supplied by Defense); and without prejudice to questions which any of the Board may wish to ask; it is our belief that in general the "Packet" should be indorsed.

Despite the rapid growth of OPC, the total FY 1953 program still only calls for about

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Unquestionably, the establishment of facilities and the training of personnel are the top priority needs of OPC today.

OPC can reasonably continue this build-up without losing operating flexibility. In the meantime, the individual training plus the consolidation of organization will be assets to OPC whatever jobs are assigned to it in the future. Consequently, although no decision is today requested of the Board, the 10/5 Panel does plan soon to submit the "Packet", or as much of it as is appropriate, to the Board for its approval.

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Obviously, any Board approval of an OPC Packet must be subject to continuous review, as national policy evolves.

But, in particular, the approval which the 10/5 Panel will soon recommend to the Board must be subsequently reviewed by both the Panel and the Board in the light of future clarifications of national policy and objectives.

D. CERTAIN UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Our study of the "Packet" has made us realize that soon the Board is to be presented with some difficult but unavoidable issues.

To eliminate any possible ambiguity — the Board will not be expected to make policy, but if the 10/5 Panel is to operate, it needs more interpretations of policy.

For example, before the Board, or the Panel acting for it, can pass on the "desirability" of a project as required by 10/5, it seems to us that the Board must provide answers to quite a number of basic questions, of which I will give two rather closely related examples:

1. Does U. S. policy, as properly interpreted, contemplate supplying overt physical support to revolutionary factions that might emerge in the wake of Stalin's death, if the situation offered a reasonable chance of changing a regime to suit U.S. interests without precipitating general war?

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It seems to us that if U.S. policy excludes this possibility, then OPC would prepare for quite a different program than it would if U.S. policy either included the possibility of such overt physical support or merely reserved to the nation the freedom to make the decision at a later date.

2. Does U.S. policy, as properly interpreted, include or exclude efforts under any circumstances to overthrow or subvert the governments of the satellites or the U.S.S.R.?

If U.S. policy excludes such efforts, then any OPC projects directed primarily or largely to those ends should be eliminated or should be retained only on the ground that preparations for such efforts may give the U.S. some freedom of decision.

If, on the other hand, the answer is "yes", or merely "maybe", then, in order to have freedom of decision at the proper moment, it would seem important for the Board to know now, and for the 10/5 Panel to find out for the Board, how much military support and what type of military support will be available. For example, do we plan to go in on foot? If not, are airborne divisions available or on order? If on order, is the lead time synchronized with the estimated date of need?

In stating these examples, no inference is intended that the Board is responsible for resolving the questions. However, in

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order that the Board may discharge its obligation with respect to the OPC program, it must, in our judgment, be fully acquainted with the answers from whatever source derived. The 10/5 Panel, in turn, must seek such answers when attempting to perform its delegated functions.

The following passages from a lead article in the April 26, 1952, issue of the London Economist express a similar dilemma in the public mind:

"The discreet silence of western diplomacy about its hopes and purposes in Eastern Europe becomes more and more conspicuous. ..."

"From the viewpoint of the Kremlin this silence of embarrassment must look like the silence of conspiracy. From London and Paris, from the land and sea stations of the Voice of America, from Radio Free Europe in Munich, and from such guerilla bases as Madrid and Belgrade and so-called "black" stations, there comes hour after hour a stream of criticism and exhortation directed at the Soviet Union and its satellites. The effort is comparable only to that of the Cominform itself. To Moscow monitoring services and to the Russians who read analyses of western output, it must all look systematic and sinister. To experienced Communists, who themselves plan ahead and think in terms of political warfare, it must seem incredible that all this activity is not harnessed to a plan for war and civil war among the western marches of the Soviet Union. To encourage resistance by words and to have no intention of supporting it later by arms does not, the Russian would argue, make sense." (emphasis supplied)

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"... the general atmosphere of conspiracy is heightened by the actual and alleged activities of the Central Intelligence Agency behind the iron curtain."

"There can, indeed, be little doubt that there is in Eastern Europe a widespread belief that time will bring what the rulers call a war of aggression and what the ruled call liberation."

"... This is obviously an unsatisfactory state of affairs, which might become dangerous. It may mean that American and British policies are out of step and that there are two policies in Washington. It may mean that planning has moved from containment pure and simple to containment plus all such interference with the Russian sphere of influence as can be safely got away with. ... In a decision to pass in Europe from containment to political, economic and social counter-attack there is nothing whatever to be ashamed of. ... What is wrong is that policy in such a matter should be formed piecemeal under the pressure of special requirements without any formulation of how far it is to go and what its ultimate objectives are to be. ..."

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"... The policy of 'containment plus' is just beginning to hurt the East; but unless it is formulated and explained, public opinion will not support it and accept its consequences."

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### E. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 10/5 PANEL

To assist in reaching a sensible working relationship between the Board and the 10/5 Panel, I am including in this final section some specific requests for guidance.

1. We should like the Board to confirm in principle the conclusion that OPC cannot create a useful apparatus unless it be authorized to develop an over-all program, in dollars and personnel, covering a period of, let us say, two or three years.

The 10/5 Panel feels that OPC, like the Army, must be allowed to tailor its apparatus to an order of magnitude. It cannot today determine precisely what operation will be needed tomorrow any more than the Army can prophesy what particular campaign it will be directed to fight. The 10/5 procedure is presently focused on approval of particular programs and projects. If the 10/5 Panel should formalize and perpetuate this type of approval, to the exclusion of more general approval, it would tend to stultify OPC's healthy development, especially if this procedure were in any way construed as requiring OPC to delay the creation and training of a useful apparatus until the Board had approved particular programs and projects.

Such approval, of course, will not affect in any way the Board's existing responsibility to review all particular programs and projects submitted under the 10/5 procedure.

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It will, however, ensure OPC the flexibility essential for the development of quality as well as of quantity, and it will permit the 10/5 Panel to prepare an over-all program for Board consideration.

Moreover, such approval in our opinion would be in keeping with the NSC decision in 10/5 already mentioned; namely, to approve "in principle as a national responsibility the immediate expansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2...". This was an approval of an increase in order of magnitude.

2. With respect to the Panel's job of screening particular programs and projects for the Board, the following are some suggested conclusions which are submitted for ratification by the Board. As you will see, they are efforts to hang flesh on the 10/5 skeleton.

a. The 10/5 Panel should not be called upon to act like a general manager of the program. This is properly the function of CIA/OPC.

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physical deterioration or loss of secrecy. Anything recommended by the Case Officer and approved by CIA and the 10/2 mechanism will be considered reasonable, in the absence of actual evidence to the contrary.

The PSB should be responsible for determining that:

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(3) The scale of the effort is reasonable.

b. Other recommendations are:

(1) That the 10/2 Representatives continue to provide the detailed, day-to-day guidance to CIA, while the 10/5 Panel provides the more general guidance, including the strategic concepts to be developed by the PSB. Details should be worked out between the 10/2 Representatives and the 10/5 Panel.

(2) That when a program appears to contribute towards the achievement of a national objective, but also appears either to be inconsistent with current national policy, or to be in an area where national policy is not

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clearly defined, the 10/5 Panel should bring the program to the attention of the Board.

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(3) That the 10/5 Panel may become concerned with the possible desirability of conducting a 10/5 program overtly rather than covertly.

For example, the "Magnitudes" paper points out that after guerilla forces have reached a certain size,

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attempts to maintain cover are ridiculous. Therefore, an increase in guerilla or resistance forces would require a further judgment as to the desirability of making the operation overt.

c. The 10/5 Panel should be authorized to ask questions designed to uncover hidden assumptions and implications in connection with any matter germane to the responsibilities delegated to it by the Board.

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